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INTRODUCTION
“Luckily for all of us, I think we are five
years away from never leaving our
homes again. . . . You can sit on your
couch, pull up your phone, and if you
want to, just be like, ‘I want bananas.
And I want hammers. And I want an
eagle’s beak.’” – Tom Segura1
Famed stand-up comic Tom Segura effectively articulates the sordid
thoughts concerning market globalization through e-commerce in a
manner that many consumers choose to ignore for the sake of
convenience.2 Although it may be difficult to obtain an eagle’s beak
through e-commerce, it is now increasingly easier to obtain intoxicating
liquors—even across state lines—via e-commerce.3 Following Congress’s
ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment,4 many states swiftly utilized
their constitutionally granted power of regulation over alcohol to adopt
varying regulatory schemes.5 The most common of these regulatory
schemes is the three-tier system of alcohol distribution, which separates
retailers and manufacturers of intoxicating spirits from wholesalers.6
1. TOM SEGURA: DISGRACEFUL (Netflix 2018).
2. See generally Beverly Bird & Carol Kopp, Globalization, INVESTOPEDIA
(May 9, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/globalization.asp [https://
perma.cc/DV6M-FVWH].
3. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
5. Desireé C. Slaybaugh, A Twisted Vine: The Aftermath of Granholm v.
Heald, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 265 (2011).
6. Id. at 266 n.6. In the three-tier regulatory distribution scheme, the
manufacturer represents the first tier, the wholesaler represents the second tier,
and the retailer represents the third tier. Id. For the purposes of this Comment,
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Those fighting for a foothold in an oversaturated alcohol market, such as
micro-wineries, micro-breweries, and micro-distilleries, tend to view the
three-tier system as a “politically effective restraint on trade” that limits
their potential to ship their products directly to out-of-state consumers.7
Wine law scholars have argued that requiring a manufacturer to go through
a wholesaler is fiscally impracticable for small businesses, such as a
micro-winery that only generates 3,000 cases of wine per year.8 In recent
years, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to remove the regulatory
barriers to entry into the alcohol market for the under-represented micromanufacturers of intoxicating liquors by preventing the states from
imposing regulatory limitations on the importation and transportation of
such liquors.9 In an increasingly universal market where the ordinary
consumer acquires products without much difficulty, the Supreme Court
has, in effect, allowed the free market to flourish in a way that appears
beneficial to both the avid alcohol consumer and the eager micromanufacturer of alcohol.10
Scholarly doubt remains as to whether a free market, absent
regulation, is most beneficial to the alcohol industry, the micromanufacturer of alcohol, and, ultimately, consumers.11 The question of
whether a free market is beneficial to the alcohol industry arises out of the
Supreme Court’s contention in Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n
v. Thomas that the jurisprudentially developed Dormant Commerce
Clause supersedes the explicit powers that the text of the Twenty-First
Amendment reserves to the states.12 Although a free market approach to
alcohol distribution may be beneficial to the average consumer of alcohol,
it is likely to be harmful to the alcohol industry.13 First and foremost, the
absence of a mandate for a three-tier model may lead to the demise of the

“producer” and “manufacturer” are used interchangeably in reference to the same
tier.
7. Id. at 266 n.9. Micro-manufacturers of alcohol encounter regulatory and
competitive barriers to entry into the alcohol market. Id.
8. JOHN M. CHURCH, WINE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2–76 (2d ed. 2014).
9. See generally Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S.
97 (1980); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Tenn. Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
10. Brief for Open Markets Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S.Ct. 2449 (2019) (No. 1896), 2018 WL 6168785.
11. Id.
12. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449.
13. See infra Section III.B.
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three-tier model—or at the very least the wholesaler tier.14 An unaltered
three-tier model allows for state taxation on each individual tier.15 The
elimination of one of these tiers results in the elimination of an entire level
of state revenue.16 Second, state action creates and structures markets.17
Indeed, Prohibition demonstrated that the United States is not a single
community where the federal government can enforce a uniform policy of
liquor control.18 Third, the role of the states as laboratories has remained a
consistent rationale for independent state regulation, and the state
imposition of varied regulations will be more beneficial to the alcohol
market than a uniform attempt at regulation from the federal government.19
Finally, the rapid over-saturation of an industry without regulatory barriers
may create a destructive market, which may lead to a decline in the quality
of alcohol and a decline in the working conditions of those employed in
the alcohol industry.20 These long-term detrimental effects on the alcohol
industry, local economies, and, ultimately, the consumer can be avoided
through carefully drafted legislation that preserves the status quo present
in the three-tier system prior to Granholm.21
Part I of this Comment will explore the early development of the
Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the implied Dormant
Commerce Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment, and the existing state
regulatory schemes governing alcohol.22 Part II will introduce Tennessee
Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas23 and discuss the problems with
the Tennessee Wine Court’s interpretation in both practice and effect.24
Part III will demonstrate Tennessee Wine’s implications on the
constitutional interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment, alcohol
14. See infra Section II.C.2.
15. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266.
16. Id.
17. Brief for Open Markets Institute, supra note 10, at *4.
18. RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL
6 (2011).
19. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“There must be power in the states and the nation to remould,
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet
changing social and economic needs.”). One of the virtues of U.S. federalism is
the ability of states to enact experimental policies that other states, or even the
federal government, can learn from and later adopt. Id.
20. JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 332–34 (6th
ed. 2016).
21. See infra Part IV.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. amend. XXI.
23. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see infra Part II.

350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd 194

2/5/21 12:55 PM

2021]

COMMENT

585

regulation, and market function.25 Part IV will provide a legislative remedy
to the result of the Court’s application and will address the viability of the
market result the Court achieved in Tennessee Wine.26
I. A WALK THROUGH THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: AT LEAST WE HAVE
LIQUOR
On December 5, 1933, Congress ratified the Twenty-First
Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment concerning
federal Prohibition of intoxicating liquors.27 The Twenty-First
Amendment’s proposed third provision, which Congress deleted prior to
ratification, sought to preserve a federal role in regulatory enforcement of
local liquor.28 Congress’s deletion of this provision demonstrated its desire
to preserve intrastate control of intoxicating liquors for the states.29 The
divisive provision, which has presented the courts with nearly a century of
cases concerning state regulatory schemes, is the enacted Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment.30 Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment
explicitly authorizes the states to regulate intoxicating liquors within their
borders.31 Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment reads: “The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”32 Over time, two
divergent interpretations of Section 2 emerged among courts, leading to
25. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449; see also Kerana Todorov, “Son of
Granholm” – Reactions to Ruling in Tennessee Case, WINE BUSINESS.COM (June
27, 2019), https://www.winebusiness.com/news/?go=getArticle&dataId=215974
[https://perma.cc/M27D-K9W7]; see infra Part III.
26. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449; see also Comprehensive Alcohol
Regulatory Effectiveness Act, H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. (2010).
27. CHURCH, supra note 8, at 2–12.
28. Sydney Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control Over
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161
(1991).
29. Id.
30. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S. 391 (1938);
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939). But cf. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v.
Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S.
263, 268 (1984); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Tenn. Wine, 139 S.
Ct. 2449.
31. Spaeth, supra note 28, at 14.
32. Compare U.S CONST. amend. XXI, with Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. 699
(1913) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122).
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contradictory stances on whether the states have gained new powers from
Section 2.33 The different interpretations of Section 2 further complicate
the textual conflict that this provision holds with the Commerce Clause of
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.34
A. Stretching Out the Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution reads, in relevant part, that
Congress shall have the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”35 On
numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has scrutinized the text of Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution and, accordingly, has crafted a nuanced
jurisprudence surrounding it.36 The scope of the commerce power extends
to the regulation of the channels of interstate commerce, the regulation of
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and the regulation of intrastate
activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce.37 The Supreme
Court has articulated that the ability of Congress to regulate under the
federal commerce power is vast, extending even to the regulation of wheat
grown by a farmer for wholly intrastate, personal use.38 For example, in
Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court held that Congress may regulate
activities, such as wheat growing, within a single state under the
Commerce Clause, provided that the activity exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce.39 This expansive holding does not suggest

33. Spaeth, supra note 28, at 161 (discussing the differences between the
“Federalist” view and the “Absolutist” view of Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35. Id.
36. THOMAS E. BAKER, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN A NUTSHELL 226 (3d
ed. 2019).
37. Id. at 228 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)).
38. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005) (holding Congress’s intrastate prohibitory power extended to local
cultivation of marijuana).
39. Wickard, 317 U.S. 111. In Wickard v. Filburn, an Ohio farmer, Filburn,
harvested approximately 12 acres of wheat from his crop for personal use—in
excess of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938’s limitation. In Wickard, the
Supreme Court reasoned that an aggregate of home-grown products would result
in a “reduction in market demand” for the aforementioned products. Filburn
argued that because the wheat was for wholly personal use and would never see
the market, it had no effect on interstate commerce. The Court held the regulation
of a wholly intrastate product for personal use was necessary, otherwise the wheat
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that the Commerce Clause is plenary and without limit.40 The broad power
that the Commerce Clause granted to Congress is subject to outer limits,
such as the requirement that the regulated activity be commercial or
economic in nature41 and the caveat that the provisional ability to regulate
commerce does not include the ability to create or mandate commerce.42
Congress’s power to regulate wholly intrastate activity as demonstrated in
Wickard remains increasingly relevant as the Court continues to analyze
state liquor laws under the Dormant Commerce Clause.43
B. Don’t Sleep on the Dormant Commerce Clause
Though the powers delegated to Congress are finite and expressly
provided—subject to generous expansion through the Supreme Court’s
power of constitutional review44—the powers reserved to the state
governments are “numerous and indefinite.”45 The Tenth Amendment
further substantiates this principle of expansive state power: “The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”46
Additionally, the Constitution reserves some powers explicitly to the
states, such as the power to conduct elections, the power to ratify
constitutional amendments, and the power to regulate intoxicating
liquors.47 The federal commerce power and the reserved police power over
alcohol that Section 2 granted to the states inevitably came into conflict
with one another.48 The existence of concurrent powers among both the
states and the federal government necessitated reconciliation.49 The
would cause a reduction in market demand and would then substantially affect
interstate commerce. Id.
40. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
41. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
42. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (holding that while possessing the
authority to regulate interstate Commerce, Congress did not possess the authority
to coerce individuals into purchasing health insurance under the federal
Commerce power).
43. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111; see infra Section I.B.
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
45. BAKER, supra note 36, at 249 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45
(Alexander Hamilton)).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
47. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. V; id. amend. XXI.
48. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But cf. id. amend. XXI.
49. BAKER, supra note 36, at 253.
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Supreme Court reached a solution that effectuated an “implied
prohibition” on the states where, even when the federal commerce power
was not active, the Commerce Clause allowed the Court to strike down
any state legislation that was found to discriminate against interstate
commerce.50 This implied prohibition on the states, creating judicial power
to regulate state law eventually, was termed the Dormant Commerce
Clause.51 The Dormant Commerce Clause provides that states cannot enact
laws that discriminate against out-of-state actors in interstate commerce or
that unduly burden interstate commerce.52
The federal government’s power to regulate state law has its early
roots in Gibbons v. Ogden.53 In Gibbons, a New York state law authorized
a monopoly over steamboat navigation of New York waters.54 The
Supreme Court struck down the New York state law, holding that the
regulation of navigation for the purposes of conducting interstate
commerce was a power that the Commerce Clause reserved to Congress.55
The first examination of the Dormant Commerce Clause appears in Justice
Johnson’s concurrence.56 There, Johnson stated that the national
government’s exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce would thus
negate any state laws interfering with this power.57 The Gibbons decision
expanded the power of Congress to regulate any commercial activity that
moved between two states.58 Importantly, Gibbons raised the question of
whether the authority that this congressional action had over state law was
absolute or subject to limitation.59
Twenty-seven years after Gibbons, the Supreme Court recognized
such a limitation of the Dormant Commerce Clause power in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens.60 In Cooley, the Court analyzed the legitimacy of a
50. Id. at 254–55.
51. Id. at 253.
52. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131 (1986); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Although
the Dormant Commerce Clause is neither enumerated in the Constitution, nor
codified in a Congressional statute, 200 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence
support its existence. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Cooley v. Bd. of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. 349.
53. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1 (demonstrating that intrastate commerce could also
be regulated under the Commerce Clause).
54. Id. at 1–2.
55. Id. at 86.
56. Id. at 87 (Johnson, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 89–90 (Johnson, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 1.
59. Id.
60. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
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Pennsylvania law that required all ships entering the port of Philadelphia
to hire a local pilot for in-port navigation.61 The Cooley Court upheld the
Pennsylvania law and recognized that commerce embraces an extensive
field of diverse subjects, some requiring a single national rule that only
Congress can make, and others best that state regulations based on local
needs serve best. This idea became formally known as the rule of
“selective exclusivity.”62 Importantly, the Cooley Court did not articulate
a framework to effectively make this distinction, which still allowed for
significant judicial discretion in invalidating state laws.63
This unfettered judicial discretion went largely unaddressed for the
next century, until the Court decided Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.64 In Pike,
Arizona passed the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act
(AFVSA), which required all Arizona-grown cantaloupes to be packaged
in standard closed containers.65 Lacking the proper packing facilities,
Bruce Church, Inc., a cantaloupe grower, shipped all of its cantaloupes to
California for packing.66 Bruce Church’s shipment to California violated
the AFVSA, but the burden this state law placed on Bruce Church and
interstate commerce led the Court to create a new test to determine state
law legitimacy.67 The Pike Court articulated that there were two levels of
analysis to determine the whether the nature of the state regulation in
question was of a local or national interest.68 The two level analysis
manifested as a two-part balancing test that courts continue to utilize in
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis today.69 The Pike balancing test
provides that a statute that (1) advances a legitimate local interest and (2)
only incidentally affects interstate commerce will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on interstate commerce outweighs the benefits of the
statute.70 Even a state law that serves a legitimate local purpose can be
considered discriminatory, but under some circumstances a state
regulation that is discriminatory in its means can survive a Dormant
Commerce Clause challenge.71
Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 299; see also BAKER, supra note 36, at 257.
Cooley, 53 U.S. at 299.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 142; see also BAKER, supra note 36, at 261.
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
Id.; see also BAKER, supra note 36, at 261.
JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 143 (9th ed. 2017).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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In its analysis of Maine v. Taylor, the Supreme Court upheld a Maine
prohibition on the importation of live baitfish due to a concern over an
infestation of non-native parasites in Maine fisheries.72 This law was not
facially discriminatory, but was discriminatory in effect against fisheries
outside of Maine that exported baitfish.73 Under the Court’s analysis, a
state is entitled to use discriminatory means to serve a legitimate local end
provided that there is no other non-discriminatory manner to achieve this
end.74 The Court reasoned that the Dormant Commerce Clause promotes
a national market and deters states from restricting this market without a
legitimate purpose.75 This opposition to state restriction conflicted with the
text of the Twenty-First Amendment, which authorizes to the states a
regulatory—and therefore potentially restrictive—authority over
alcohol.76
Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis from Maine v.
Taylor, the Supreme Court in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias analyzed the
constitutionality of a state alcohol regulation.77 In Bacchus, the Court
analyzed a Hawaiian liquor tax imposed on sales of liquor at wholesale
and a liquor tax exemption offered for local fruit wines.78 The Court struck
down the Hawaiian liquor tax exemption specifically for okolehao and
pineapple wine, finding the tax exemption discriminated against the
importation of out-of-state products.79 The State mounted an argument that
Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution saved the
exemption even in light of a Dormant Commerce Clause violation.80 At
the time of the Bacchus decision, the Supreme Court had significantly
abated the scope of Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment from its
breadth at the time of ratification.81 The Court did so by abandoning a
textualist reading of the Twenty-First Amendment in its analysis of
multiple cases concerning state regulation of alcohol and tapered back the

72. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
73. Id. at 132–33.
74. Id. at 131; BARRON & DIENES, supra note 71, at 143.
75. Maine, 477 U.S. at 132.
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
77. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 273. Okolehao is a native Hawaiian intoxicating spirit comparable
to whiskey.
80. Id. at 268.
81. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936); see also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
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initial plenary authority that Section 2 granted to the states.82 Under the
Bacchus interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment, the principles
underlying the Amendment had to be “sufficiently implicated by the
exemption” such that they outweighed the offended Commerce Clause
principles.83 Specifically, the exemption must implicate the Twenty-First
Amendment’s underlying principles of temperance in order to pass the
Dormant Commerce Clause test.84 Although this abatement of the scope
of Section 2 was a recent development with the Bacchus decision, early
Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence and legislation predating the
Eighteenth Amendment set the foundation for Section 2’s interpretation.85
To better understand the Court’s various interpretations of the scope of
Section 2, it is necessary to analyze the entire development of
jurisprudence and legislative history pertaining to alcohol.86
C. From Early Prohibition to Lowered Inhibitions
Before the Twenty-First Amendment, and even before the Eighteenth
Amendment’s prohibition of alcohol, each state enacted its own legislation
concerning alcohol regulation.87 The most prominent early legislation
spurring the prohibitionist sentiment was the Maine Law of 1851, which
prohibited all intoxicating liquors in Maine because of legislative fear
regarding the dangers alcohol posed to society.88 This law served as the
model that several states to followed to eliminate the consumption and
manufacture of intoxicating liquors.89 Eventually a number of other states
enacted their own variant of the Maine Law, setting a prohibitionist tone
in state legislatures.90 These prohibitionist state laws did not achieve their
intended purpose; instead, the United States saw a sharp increase in the
82. Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 277.
83. Id.
84. See generally Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 97; Tenn. Wine &
Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
85. See generally Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 97; Tenn. Wine,
139 S. Ct. 2449; see also 27 U.S.C. §§ 121–22.
86. See infra Section I.C.
87. THOMAS PINNEY, A HISTORY OF WINE IN AMERICA: FROM THE
BEGINNING TO PROHIBITION 431 (1989).
88. Id.
89. Id. “The Maine Law was quickly followed by similar laws all over the
Union—Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, New York, New Hampshire, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Nebraska Territory all followed suit in the next four years.” Id.
90. Id. at 431; see Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
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consumption of intoxicating spirits.91 Scholars have suggested that the
pugnacious nature of these attempts at regulation and the ensuing effects
of increased alcohol consumption sparked the push toward nationwide
prohibition of alcohol through federal constitutional amendment.92 Even
in light of this renewed social vigor toward constitutional prohibition, both
the state and federal legislatures continued their attempts to permit state
regulation of alcohol, contrary to the apparent will of the judiciary.93
A series of cases followed in which the Supreme Court invalidated
various restrictive state liquor regulations, contrary to the social outcry
against Prohibition, the most problematic being Leisy v. Hardin.94 In Leisy,
Illinois citizens imported intoxicating spirits into Illinois contrary to an
Illinois statute that restricted the importation of alcohol into the state,
subject to pharmaceutical or religious exceptions.95 The Leisy Court held
that states could not ban the sale of imported liquor in its original
package.96 In effect, this holding rendered out-of-state liquor immune from
local regulation—even the regulation of dry states—provided the liquor
remained in its original packing.97 This holding was problematic because
even if the states sought to heavily regulate or ban in-state alcohol
products, there existed an immunity to out-of-state alcohol products
provided they remained in their original packaging.98 This defeated the
purpose of any heavy state regulation and proved to be a glaring
loophole.99 Congress attempted to close this loophole and establish
regulatory uniformity through legislation.100
91. PINNEY, supra note 87, at 431.
92. Id.; RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR
CONTROL 4 (2011) (discussing the difficulties in enforcing both state and federal
prohibitionist laws without local law enforcement in the absence of a larger
agency).
93. See 27 U.S.C. §§ 121–22.
94. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
95. Id. at 105.
96. Id. at 124–25. The containment of the liquor in its original packaging
upon arrival to its final destination implied that the shipment was for personal use
as opposed to resale distribution. Id.
97. Leisy, 135 U.S. 100.
98. See CHURCH, supra note 8, at 2–8.
99. See id. (discussing the loophole left behind by Leisy v. Hardin). For the
purposes of this Comment, the loophole from Leisy will be referred to as the
“Leisy loophole.”
100. Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121). The Wilson
Act provides:
That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids
transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use,
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The first legislation Congress passed to meet this end was the Wilson
Act of 1890.101 The Wilson Act sought to close this loophole by allowing
states to regulate imported liquor “to the same extent and in the same
manner” as domestic liquor.102 Seven years after the legislature’s attempt
to remedy the Leisy loophole with the Wilson Act, the Court heard Scott
v. Donald, a case involving a constitutional challenge to a South Carolina
law that required all liquor sales to go through the state liquor
commissioner.103 The Court found that two sections of South Carolina’s
law were discriminatory.104 The Court interpreted the Wilson Act not as
an authorization for this discriminatory conduct, but rather as a mandate
for “uniformity of treatment” between in-state and out-of-state products.105
After Scott, the federal government required states to adhere to the
nondiscrimination principle of “uniformity of treatment” when enacting
legislation concerning in-state and out-of-state liquor.106 The Court further
demonstrated its limitation on the authority of states to regulate liquor
imports in another pre-Prohibition case, Rhodes v. Iowa.107
In Rhodes, the Court affirmed the nondiscrimination principle of the
Wilson Act, but carefully hedged its second holding to provide that
consumers possessed the right to receive intoxicating liquors shipped in
interstate commerce for personal use free from state regulation.108 This
interpretation of the Wilson Act thus only allowed for state regulation of
the resale of intoxicating liquors, not the direct shipment to consumers for

consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or
Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State
or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same
extent and in the same manner as though such liquids had been produced
in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason
of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise.
27 U.S.C. § 121 (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (quoting 27 U.S.C. § 121).
103. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897).
104. Id.
105. Id. Section 15 of South Carolina’s dispensary law required the state liquor
commissioner to purchase his supplies from in-state brewers and distillers.
Section 23 limited markup for profit on locally produced wines to 10%, whereas
there was no such limitation in place for out-of-state wines, allowing them to be
marked up indefinitely and likely be inaccessible to many consumers. Id.
106. 27 U.S.C. § 121.
107. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
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personal use.109 Congress intended to close the Leisy loophole with the
Wilson Act; however, it remained open because of the Rhodes Court’s
reading of the Act’s language, “upon arrival in such State or Territory.”110
Such language, according to the Court, meant upon arrival to the actual
consignee and not the arrival within state lines.111 According to Rhodes,
the state did not obtain the right to regulate the intoxicating liquors under
the text of the Wilson Act until the product reached the hands of the
customer, at which point it was too late for the states to enforce any
regulation.112
Congress next attempted to close the Leisy loophole with the WebbKenyon Act of 1913.113 The Webb-Kenyon Act prohibited the shipment
or transportation of any alcohol from one state into another if such
transportation would violate the recipient state’s laws.114 The WebbKenyon Act’s intended effect directly conflicted with the Court’s second
holding in Rhodes, which subjected the Act to careful examination
regarding its constitutionality.115 The Court in Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Maryland Railway interpreted the Webb-Kenyon Act’s
purpose—as well as the Wilson Act’s purpose—to be the prevention of
the receipt of intoxicating liquors into a state through the Leisy loophole.116
In doing so, the Court acknowledged both Acts’ intended goal: to
eliminate any regulatory advantage provided to imported liquor over
domestic liquor under the Rhodes approach.117 As such, the Clark Court’s
interpretation of the Webb-Kenyon Act provided deference to the state
regulatory authority and closed the Leisy loophole.118
The success of the Webb-Kenyon Act providing deference to state
regulation merely motivated the leading prohibitionist political party, the
Anti-Saloon League (ASL), to pursue a constitutional amendment in its
109. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 480 (2005) (discussing the two
holdings in Rhodes).
110. Rhodes, 170 U.S. 412.
111. Id.
112. See generally id.
113. 27 U.S.C. § 122.
114. Id. (“The shipment or transportation . . . of any spirituous, vinous, malted,
fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any kind from one State . . . into any
other State . . . which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other
intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person interested therein, to be received,
possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise,
in violation of any law of such State . . . is prohibited.”).
115. Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
116. Id.
117. See generally Rhodes, 170 U.S. 412.
118. See CHURCH, supra note 8, at 2–8.
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march toward nationwide prohibition.119 The ASL’s pursuit of a
constitutional amendment was so effective that, at the time the states
ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, the vast majority of the states were
already effectively prohibitionist, dubbed “Dry.”120 The ASL’s final push
toward Prohibition was successful in 1919 with the ratification of the
Eighteenth Amendment.121
A mere 13 years after the Eighteenth Amendment’s ratification, the
Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment.122 Section
1 of the Twenty-First Amendment repealed Prohibition; however, Section
2 of the amendment served as a textual grant of state authority to regulate
alcohol.123 The Supreme Court began its judicial analysis of the extent of
state power under Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment within three
years of its ratification.124 The Court’s analysis in early cases focused on
the text of Section 2 and concluded that the states held an “extremely broad
power” with respect to the regulation of alcohol.125 The seminal case that
conducted a textual analysis of Section 2 was California Board of
Equalization v. Young’s Market Co.126 In Young’s, the Supreme Court
declined to strike down a California statute imposing a license fee of $500
for importation of beer within its borders.127 The Court reasoned that the
broad grant of state power under Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment was clearly plenary; thus, the California law did not implicate
the Dormant Commerce Clause in any discriminatory manner.128
The Court further expounded upon the broad scope of Section 2 two
years later in Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission.129
In Indianapolis Brewing, the Court stated that the Commerce Clause does
not limit the right of a state to regulate the importation of intoxicating
119. Id. The Anti-Saloon League was a federation of churches and temperance
societies that spearheaded the movement toward prohibition and would grow to
become a powerful political organization. Id. at 2–4.
120. PINNEY, supra note 87, at 431. Thirty-three of the then 48 states were dry
at the time of ratification. Id.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
122. Id. amends. XVIII, XXI.
123. Id. amend. XXI, §§ 1–2.
124. CHURCH, supra note 8, at 2–30.
125. Id.
126. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936).
127. Id. at 60.
128. Id. at 63–64.
129. Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S. 391
(1938).
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liquor.130 Indianapolis Brewing involved the analysis of a Michigan
reciprocity statute, which prohibited Michigan retailers from selling beer
manufactured in Indiana.131 The Michigan statute prohibited Michigan
manufacturers from selling to Indiana purchasers because Indiana had a
statute discriminating against beer manufactured in Michigan.132 The
Court held that the Michigan statute was valid regardless of its punitive
nature against Indiana, stating that the Twenty-First Amendment
authorized this form of protectionism.133
One year later in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves,134 the Supreme Court reemphasized the states’ police power to regulate intoxicating liquor.135 The
Court in Ziffrin analyzed Kentucky shipping regulations that prevented an
Indiana transportation company from engaging in the transportation of
Kentucky whiskey directly to consignees in Chicago.136 Kentucky enacted
these transportation restrictions on the Indiana transportation company
because of a disdain for the Indiana company’s direct-to-consignee
shipment.137 This regulation served no purpose for the state of Kentucky
other than to limit alcohol traffic to “minimize well known evils.”138 Even
in light of this clear discriminatory intent, the Court opined that the states
possessed a full police authority to regulate the manufacture, sale,
transportation, and possession of intoxicating spirits under the TwentyFirst Amendment.139
These early cases interpreted Section 2 as granting the states complete
discretion over the regulation of intoxicating liquors.140 In 1945, 12 years
after the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, the Supreme Court
laid a new foundation for permitting federal commerce power over alcohol
130. Id.
131. Id. at 392–93.
132. Id.; see also CHURCH, supra note 8, at 2–33.
133. Indianapolis Brewing, 305 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he right of a state to prohibit
or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce
clause . . . and discrimination between domestic and imported intoxicating
liquors, is not prohibited by the equal protection clause.”); see also CHURCH,
supra note 8, at 2–33.
134. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 133.
137. Id. at 134.
138. Id. at 139.
139. Id. at 132.
140. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S. 391 (1938);
Ziffrin, 308 U.S. 132.
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in United States v. Frankfort Distilleries.141 In Frankfort, Colorado
wholesalers, retailers, and producers were conspiring to artificially fix the
prices of out-of-state imported alcohol through “fair trade” contracts.142
The Court analyzed whether the three-tier conspirators’ actions violated
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.143 The Court held that the Twenty-First
Amendment only gave states plenary authority when regulating intrastate
liquor traffic, whereas the conspirators sought to regulate interstate liquor
traffic.144 This holding was not groundbreaking, as Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution already explicitly reserves to Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce.145 Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Frankfort distinguished its rule of law from that of
Ziffrin.146 Justice Frankfurter adopted and expounded upon the early postratification Court’s textualist view that the Twenty-First Amendment
authorized states to enact “insurmountable” barriers against the entry of
intoxicating liquors.147 Frankfurter stated that under Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment, a state has the authority to treat alcohol
products differently than all other products subject to Commerce Clause
analysis.148 According to Frankfurter, if a state does not avail itself of the
alternative treatment of alcohol products, then alcohol would be subject to
the same Commerce Clause scrutiny as all other products.149 Thus, even
after Frankfort, if a state treated alcohol as an alternative product through
intrastate regulation, it remained immune from Commerce Clause
scrutiny.150 The next critical case analyzed in the context of the TwentyFirst Amendment’s regulatory authority also dealt with “fair trade”
contracts.151
In 1980, in its analysis of California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal
Aluminum, the Court chose to analyze the history behind, as opposed to
141. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
142. Id. at 295. A “fair-trade” contract is a contract with which an industry-set
mandatory price minimum on certain products is enforced. Adam Hayes, Fair
Trade Price, INVESTOPEDIA (July 3, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
f/fair-trade-price.asp [https://perma.cc/UA7A-8D5N].
143. Frankfort, 324 U.S. at 294.
144. Id. at 299.
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
146. Frankfort, 324 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suggesting that there are
circumstances where alcohol is not given complete immunity to Commerce
Clause analysis).
148. Id. at 300–01 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
149. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
150. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
151. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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the text contained within, the Twenty-First Amendment.152 In Midcal, a
California statute required all wine producers and wholesalers to file fair
trade contracts or price schedules with the state.153 If a wine producer
failed to file a fair trade contract, the wholesaler was required to set a price
schedule and would face fines or suspension for selling to a retailer below
the price in the price schedule.154 The respondent, wine wholesaler Midcal
Aluminum, faced fines for selling wine below the price set out in the price
schedule and sought injunctive relief from the state’s fines.155 The Court
acknowledged the Twenty-First Amendment’s textual grant of authority
for states to regulate liquor, yet sought to define the state regulatory
authority under the federal commerce power.156 Citing Hostetter v.
Idlewild Liquor Corp., the Midcal Court viewed a strictly textual analysis
of the Twenty-First Amendment as an “oversimplification” and instead
considered the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment in
light of one another.157 The Midcal Court held that the Twenty-First
Amendment granted states broad authority over “whether to permit
importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution
system,” but acknowledged that any other state-enforced liquor
regulations may, under certain circumstances, be subject to the Commerce
Clause.158 The holding from Midcal signifies the Court’s first steps toward
limiting the broad scope of Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.159
D. Three Tiers for Several Years: Emerging Regulatory Schemes
The Court’s acknowledgment of the continued existence of state
regulatory authority over intoxicating liquors after Midcal also narrowed
the extent of that authority under the federal commerce power.160 This
reduced regulatory authority resulted in a diversification of the liquor

152. Id.
153. Id. at 99. A price schedule is a collection of all the items a vendor may
offer to a consumer for purchase at a specific standardized price. Price Schedule,
BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/price-schedule
.html [https://perma.cc/LZA4-SKV7] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
154. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 99.
155. Id. at 100.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 109 (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332
(1964)).
158. Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 97.
160. Id. at 110.
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regulatory schemes from state to state.161 These regulatory schemes
existed long before the Court analyzed Midcal, beginning nearly
immediately after ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment.162
Following the end of Prohibition with the Twenty-First Amendment, the
states split largely into two different groups based on their approaches to
the regulation of alcohol—the control states and the license states.163 In
control states the state possesses a monopoly over the alcohol industry and
its regulation.164 Conversely, in license states there is no government
monopolization over the industry, but rather regulation of the industry
participants.165 Since the Midcal decision, the primary issues that courts
have faced lie with the license states’ regulatory actions.166
1. The Three-Tier Model
Most license states adopted the three-tier model shortly after
ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment as their method of regulating
alcohol distribution.167 The three-tier model divides the alcohol market
into three tiers: (1) alcohol producers, (2) wholesalers, and (3) alcohol
retailers.168 In a traditional three-tier scheme, the wholesaler is a necessary
middleman to distribute the alcohol from the producer to the retailer.169
Although there are several underlying policy considerations embodied
within the three-tier model, the three-tier model was originally adopted in
response to illegal bootleg activities persisting from Prohibition.170 The
rationale behind the implementation of a systematic regulatory scheme
was to eliminate the utility of bootlegging by restricting access from
criminal liquor manufacturers to the retailers.171 Originally, states
implemented the three-tier system for three reasons: (1) to discourage
overconsumption, (2) to deter monopolies, and (3) to prevent organized
161. CHURCH, supra note 8, at 2–29.
162. Id.
163. See DOUGLAS GLEN WHITMAN, STRANGE BREW: ALCOHOL AND
GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY (2003).
164. Id.
165. See id. Some control states also monopolized the retail aspect of
intoxicating liquors. Id.
166. See generally Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S.
97 (1980); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Tenn. Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
167. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266.
168. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
169. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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crime from permeating the industry as it did prior to and through
Prohibition.172 Members of both the production tier and the retail tier have
expressed grievances regarding the increase in both production costs and
costs to the consumer that accompanies membership in the wholesaler
tier.173 Conversely, some retailers find the system beneficial for diversity
of inventory and circulation of spirits.174 For example, in a direct-shipment
scheme—a regulatory scheme which features no middle wholesaler tier—
a retailer is limited to ordering within its general sphere of known alcohol
producers.175 Through a wholesaler in a three-tier scheme, however, a
retailer may be introduced to new alcohol producers and products outside
of what is readily accessible.176 This is because of the difference in purpose
behind a retailer and a wholesaler.177 A wholesaler exists to acquire a
diverse inventory of alcohol products and distribute these alcohol products
to as many retailers as feasible.178
The three-tier regulatory scheme has multiple variants.179 The
traditional three-tier scheme sees equal treatment for both in-state and outof-state manufacturers of spirits.180 The limited three-tier system sees
states allowing in-state manufacturers to circumvent the three-tiered
system by adopting protectionist laws.181 Granholm v. Heald addressed
two examples of protectionist statutes that allowed in-state producers of
alcohol to bypass multiple tiers.182 The regulatory schemes addressed in
Granholm allowed in-state alcohol manufacturers to circumvent the threetiered system and sell directly to retailers, while not offering the same
incentive to out-of-state alcohol manufacturers.183

172. Daniel Glynn, Granholm’s Ends Do Not Justify the Means: The TwentyFirst Amendment’s Temperance Goals Trump Free Market Idealism, 8 J. L. ECON.
& POL’Y 113, 126 (2011).
173. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 267.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). The Court in Granholm
analyzed the constitutionality of New York and Michigan regulatory schemes
discriminating against out-of-state alcohol manufacturers. Id.
182. Id. at 460.
183. Id. at 493; Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
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2. Granholm v. Heald
In Granholm, the Court analyzed the validity of both New York and
Michigan statutes to determine whether they were discriminatory.184 The
Michigan statute featured a “wine-maker” exception, which allowed instate wineries to bypass the wholesaler and retailer tiers and directly ship
their wine to consumers, whereas out-of-state wineries still had to go
through the wholesaler and retailer tiers of the traditional three-tier
model.185 The New York statute authorized in-state wineries to obtain a
license that allowed them to similarly bypass the wholesaler and retailer
tiers for direct shipment; however, the statute did not explicitly prevent instate wineries from selling out-of-state wine to the consumers.186 The New
York statute’s carefully hedged provision that allowed the sale of out-ofstate wines was facially non-discriminatory.187 There was, however,
another provision that rendered this direct-shipment statute
discriminatory.188 The Granholm Court analyzed an additional
discriminatory provision that required any out-of-state wine bound for
direct shipment to a consumer by an in-state winery to consist of 75% New
York grapes.189
The Court ruled that a “wine-maker” license that provides an
exception to the three-tier distribution system for in-state wineries, but
does not provide the same exception for out-of-state wineries, violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause.190 The Granholm Court’s rationale in
reaching this holding was not only predicated upon an analysis of the
legislative intent of the Twenty-First Amendment, but also upon the
legislative intent of the Webb-Kenyon Act .191 The Court in Granholm
demonstrated that the language from Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment was nearly identical to the language utilized in Section 2 of
the pre-Prohibition Webb-Kenyon Act.192 The Court interpreted this
184. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 465.
185. Id. at 469.
186. Id. at 470.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 460. The three-tier distribution system is a regulatory scheme that
select states exercise over alcohol and that mandates that a manufacturer of
intoxicating spirits must sell to a wholesaler and that that wholesaler must then
sell to a retailer before the alcoholic product reaches the consumer. See
Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 265.
191. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460.
192. Id.; 27 U.S.C. § 122.
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textual similarity to mean that the legislative intent behind the WebbKenyon Act applied to the legislative intent of Section 2 of the TwentyFirst Amendment.193 Under this analysis, the intent behind both of these
legislative provisions was to promote temperance through a grant of state
regulatory authority over alcohol while also “constitutionalizing the
Commerce Clause framework established under [the Webb-Kenyon
Act.]”194 From here, the Court opined that the “broad power to regulate
liquor” was limited to whether to permit or ban the sale of alcohol.195
The Court’s limitation of state authority under Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment in Granholm was the most significant
narrowing of the scope of Section 2 post-Midcal.196 After the Court’s
decision in Midcal, the Twenty-First Amendment continued to grant states
broad authority over structuring their liquor distribution systems.197
Ultimately, the Granholm decision further limited the states’ grant of
authority under Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment from the
already diminished scope the states held after the Midcal decision.198
3. The Effects of Granholm
As the Court continued to analyze state regulation of alcohol under
Dormant Commerce Clause principles, many of the state-imposed
regulatory barriers began to fall, particularly the bans on direct-toconsumer shipment.199 As of 1985, no state permitted the direct shipment
of alcohol.200 More than a decade after the Granholm decision, however,
42 states allowed some form direct-to-consumer shipments of wine from
in-state manufacturers.201 In response to Granholm, three states enacted
legislation that permitted the direct shipment of wine on equal terms.202
193. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460; Matthew Mann, A Decade After Granholm:
Have the Tectonic Plates of DTC Shifted?, WINE DIRECT (July 7, 2015), https://
www.winedirect.com/resources/knowledge-center/a-decade-after-granholm-havethe-tectonic-plates-of-dtc-shifted [https://perma.cc/ZEZ4-3MX3].
194. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484; Mann, supra note 193.
195. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493; Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
196. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460; Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. 97.
197. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 97.
198. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493; Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 97.
199. See William C. Green, Creating a Common Market for Wine: Boutique
Wines, Direct Shipment, and State Alcohol Regulation, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13
(2012).
200. Id. at 38; Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 97.
201. Green, supra note 199, at 38.
202. Id.
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These equal-terms shipments depended on whether the states had
reciprocity laws,203 or laws governing importation and distribution of
alcohols similar enough to one another to justify the same practices
between the two states as were allowed within the one state.204 Courts
found that 13 states’ reciprocity laws, including California’s,
discriminated against interstate commerce because a reciprocity
agreement with some states and not others was, in effect, discriminatory
to the states without a reciprocity agreement.205 As an alternative to
expanding the capabilities of direct shipments to out-of-state alcohol
manufacturers, 10 “closed” states prohibited all direct shipments of
wine.206 Granholm did not affect these states as they did not discriminate
against out-of-state manufacturers of intoxicating spirits in any manner.207
Granholm directly affected 37 states because those states had enacted
laws and regulations that discriminated against out-of-state alcohol
manufacturers.208 Twenty-three states adopted either the limited directshipment regulatory scheme, which was consistent with the Michigan law
in Granholm, or the New York regulatory scheme, which was on its face
less discriminatory but in effect placed a heavier economic burden on outof-state manufacturers.209 Interestingly enough, Connecticut practiced
reverse discrimination by allowing out-of-state wineries to practice direct
shipment but prohibiting as much for in-state wineries.210 After Granholm,
Connecticut began allowing direct shipment for in-state wineries as
well.211
Granholm set the stage for state legislatures by creating a national
marketplace for the direct shipment of wine from manufacturer to
consumer, but Granholm did not completely open the door to free
203. See, e.g., Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S.
391 (1938). The Michigan statute under analysis in Indianapolis Brewing is an
example of a reciprocity law. Id.; see State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
204. See generally Indianapolis Brewing, 305 U.S. 391; see WHITMAN, supra
note 164.
205. Green, supra note 199, at 39 n.209 (listing the “thirteen reciprocity states
prior to Granholm” as “California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin”).
206. Id. at 39.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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consumer shipment.212 Granholm only called for the equal treatment of
both in-state and out-of-state wineries and did not explicitly address the
conduct of alcohol retailers.213 The Granholm Court’s failure to address
the states’ regulatory power over retailers left the door open for
discriminatory state regulation on the retailer tier.214 Justice Alito’s focus
on the durational-residency requirement in crafting a narrow holding is
responsible for such lack of discussion.215 Sympathizers of the three-tier
model utilized the absence of retailer-centric language in Granholm and
bolstered it with the language of the Granholm Court, which described the
three-tier system, existing as a state regulatory mechanism over alcohol,
as “unquestionably legitimate.”216
After Granholm, most states’ alcohol markets did not develop into
open systems.217 An open system is a particular variant of economic
system that possesses no regulatory barriers to free market activity.218 A
key characteristic of an open system is that it has competitive barriers to
entry but no regulatory barriers to entry.219 The delayed development
toward an open system is a result of existing state legislation preserving
the three-tier system.220 Even after Granholm, most states’ revised statutes
were designed to preserve the usefulness of the three-tier system and to
protect the economic interests of states’ wholesalers and local wineries.221
It remains unclear as to whether the absence of regulatory barriers to entry

212. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); see also Emma Balter, Will the
Supreme Court’s Tennessee Decision Dramatically Change the U.S. Wine
Market?, WINE SPECTATOR (July 12, 2019), https://www.winespectator.com/art
icles/will-the-supreme-court-wine-decision-reshape-the-u-s-wine-market [https:/
/perma.cc/9FB6-2M9V].
213. Balter, supra note 212.
214. Id.; cf. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460; Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n
v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
215. Mitch Frank, What the Supreme Court Said—and Didn’t Say—About
Wine, WINE SPECTATOR (July 22, 2019), https://www.winespectator.com/articles
/what-the-supreme-court-said-and-didn-t-say-about-wine [https://perma.cc/462K
-PB2A].
216. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (2005) (quoting North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990)).
217. Troy Segal, Open Market, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www
.investopedia.com/terms/o/open-market.asp [https://perma.cc/REB6-SKLY].
218. Id. The terms “open system” and “open market” are utilized
interchangeably.
219. Id.
220. Green, supra note 199, at 42.
221. Id.
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into the alcohol market will be beneficial to the alcohol market in the long
term.222
Under the regulatory three-tier scheme there exists a number of
regulatory barriers that modern cases analyzing Section 2 of the TwentyFirst Amendment have attempted to eliminate.223 One potential reason for
the judicial elimination of regulatory barriers is that both producers and
retailers of alcohol complained about the increased cost of distributing
through a wholesaler and about the elevated pricing of alcohol distributed
through wholesalers, respectively.224 These are examples of market
regulations creating an increase in cost to both manufacturers and
consumers by mandating the use of the wholesaler as a middleman, as
opposed to the market freely enabling these parties.225 The significance of
an open-market scheme is apparent in its defining characteristic.226
Possessing only competitive barriers and no regulatory barriers to trade,
products circulating on an open system are priced and purchased at their
true value to the consumer.227 The absence of regulatory barriers allows
traditional supply and demand to rule the market, effectively leveling the
playing field between the struggling micro-manufacturer of alcohol and
the large manufacturing conglomerates.228 An open market produces the
same effect as a free market system: the reduction and elimination of any
discriminatory effects that regulatory barriers may place on imports and
exports.229 The elimination of regulatory barriers allows for a
diversification of alcoholic products in the market and a potential
revitalization of the business models of obscure producers of alcohol.230
The modern cases analyzing Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment
have thus far resulted in a gradual elimination of the regulatory barriers,
which, until now, have prevented an oversaturation of the alcohol
market.231
222. See infra Section III.B.
223. See generally Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S.
97 (1980); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Tenn. Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
224. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266.
225. See, e.g., id. at 266 n.6.
226. Segal, supra note 217.
227. Id.
228. HARRISON, supra note 20, at 13–16; see also Green, supra note 199, at 42.
229. Segal, supra note 217.
230. See generally Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266.
231. See generally Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S.
97 (1980); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Tenn. Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
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II. TENNESSEE WINE: GRANHOLM’S SUCCESSOR
Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas stands apart from
its predecessor Granholm because it directly addresses the retailer of
intoxicating liquors, as opposed to the manufacturer.232 After Granholm,
participants in the alcohol industry were concerned with the ambiguity
surrounding whether the holding in Granholm applied only to products
and producers or also encompassed retailers.233 Proponents of the
aforementioned open economic system for alcohol distribution hoped for
the latter outcome, as the Supreme Court had not yet addressed the
ambiguity surrounding the ability of states to discriminate as to direct
shipments from retailers prior to Tennessee Wine.234
A. Wait or Find Another State
The Court in Tennessee Wine analyzed the durational-residency
requirements imposed on persons and companies wishing to operate liquor
retail stores in Tennessee.235 Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, there
were three residency requirements under scrutiny: (1) that an applicant for
an initial liquor license must have resided in Tennessee for the
immediately preceding two years; (2) that an applicant seeking to renew
this liquor license, where annual renewal was mandatory, must have
resided in Tennessee for ten years consecutively; and (3) that a
corporation’s stockholders must all be Tennessee residents for the
corporation to obtain a liquor license.236 While the Sixth Circuit
invalidated two of these requirements, the Supreme Court determined the
validity of the two-year residency requirement for initial applicants.237
1. The Sixth Circuit Does Two-Thirds of the Job
In the Byrd v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, a divided
panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the invalidity of
Tennessee’s ten-year residency renewal requirement, the corporation
stockholder residency requirement, and the two-year durational
residency.238 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit held that the two-year residency
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd 216

Compare Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449, with Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460.
Balter, supra note 212.
See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Byrd v. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 883 F.3d 608 (2018).
Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2454–55 (citing Byrd, 883 F.3d 608).
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requirement violated the principles of the Dormant Commerce Clause and
acknowledged the “complicated history” surrounding the doctrine.239 The
Sixth Circuit allied with the Tennessee attorney general’s stance that the
residency requirements discriminated against out-of-state economic
interests.240 The Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association
(TWSRA) filed a petition for writ of certiorari with respect to the Sixth
Circuit’s invalidation of only the two-year durational residency
requirement.241
2. An Extension of Granholm: Retailers Not Excluded
The Supreme Court held that the power to regulate in-state alcohol
distribution did not extend to discrimination against out-of-state alcohol
products.242 In doing so, Justice Alito stated in the majority opinion that
Granholm never limited the Commerce Clause analysis to discrimination
against the products or producers, but rather that the Commerce Clause
prohibits state discrimination against all out-of-state economic interests.243
The Tennessee Wine decision prohibited states from discriminating against
other states through regulation of alcohol manufacturers and retailers
within the three-tier regulatory model.244 This prohibition firmly
eliminated the states’ last untailored regulatory discretion over alcohol,
subject only to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test and the Maine v.
Taylor exception, which would only apply in the event of regulation under
the legitimate state interest of promoting temperance and market
growth.245
In its interpretation of the legislative intent behind Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment, the Court looked to the informative preProhibition Act that the Twenty-First Amendment inherited its text from:
239. Id. The “complicated history” referenced by the Sixth Circuit refers to the
complicated history between how the Twenty-First Amendment and the Dormant
Commerce Clause have traditionally interacted with each other and the
impositions the courts have recognized of one upon the other. Specifically, since
ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, the courts have deviated greatly from
the initial plenary regulatory authority they initially perceived the amendment to
grant states, because of the discriminatory effects certain regulations might have.
See supra Section I.B., I.C.
240. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2457–58; see also Byrd, 883 F.3d 608.
241. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2452.
242. Id. at 2475.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Balter, supra note 212.
245. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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the Webb-Kenyon Act.246 There is a significant inconsistency among
interpretations of Section 2 from the early post-ratification cases to the
modern cases of Granholm and Tennessee Wine.247 The early Court
interpreted the state power to regulate alcohol under Section 2 as
plenary.248 The modern Court interpreted the state power over alcohol
under Section 2 as subject to Dormant Commerce Clause limitations.249
The Tennessee Wine Court reconciled the discrepancy in interpretation
between the early and modern cases by stating that the earlier Court’s
failure to account for the history embodied in the Wilson and WebbKenyon Acts led the Court to render an improper interpretation.250
The Tennessee Wine Court first interpreted the Wilson Act’s goal as
leaving the decision of whether to allow alcohol within a state’s borders.251
Further, the Court stated that the Wilson Act mandated equal treatment for
alcohol regulation, whether produced within or outside a state, as opposed
to favorable regulation for local alcoholic products.252 The Court then
stated that the purpose behind the Webb-Kenyon Act was to afford each
state a measure of regulatory authority over the importation of alcohol.253
The majority referred to this as a “drafting problem” and stated that the
Webb-Kenyon Act was not meant to grant states authority to regulate
alcohol in interstate commerce, but to prohibit illegal conduct, such as the
importation of liquor into “dry” states.254 It is significant that the equal
treatment provision from the Wilson Act is absent in the text of the WebbKenyon Act.255 The Court reasoned that the Webb-Kenyon Act was meant

246. 27 U.S.C. § 122.
247. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S. 391 (1938);
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939). But cf. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v.
Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S.
263, 268 (1984); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Tenn. Wine, 139 S.
Ct. at 2449.
248. See Young’s, 299 U.S. at 59; Indianapolis Brewing, 305 U.S. at 391;
Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 132.
249. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 97; Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 268;
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460; Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
250. See generally Young’s, 299 U.S. at 59; Indianapolis Brewing, 305 U.S. at
391; Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 132 .
251. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2465–66.
252. Id. at 2466.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 121, with id. § 122.
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to correct the Leisy loophole256 that the Wilson Act failed to correct.257
Thus, the Court held that the two Acts should be read together to suggest
that the Webb-Kenyon Act was meant to mandate equal treatment.258
Since the text of the Webb-Kenyon Act was the model for Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment, the Court contended that the equal treatment
mandate from the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts should be imputed to
the legislative intent behind Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.259
3. A Dissent against the Dormant Commerce Clause
Authoring the dissent in Tennessee Wine, Justice Gorsuch referred to
the Dormant Commerce Clause as “peculiar” and pointed out that the
doctrine is absent in the text of the Constitution.260 Justice Gorsuch began
his dissent with a number of concessions, the first of which was that
Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment does not immunize state laws
from all constitutional claims.261 As an immediate counter, however,
Justice Gorsuch asserted that a challenge under the Dormant Commerce
Clause is not based on any constitutional provision, but rather that it is
implied from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.262 Under this
analysis, the dissent contended that in the event a doctrine implied from a
constitutional provision conflicted with another express constitutional
provision, the textually authorized provision should take precedence.263
Justice Gorsuch’s argument challenged the validity of the Dormant
Commerce Clause as a whole.264 The dissent criticized the majority for
relying on the sparse legislative history of the Amendment as opposed to

256. See supra Section I.C (discussing the loophole from the Court’s
interpretation of Leisy v. Hardin).
257. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2466.
258. Id.
259. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2469.
260. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2477 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Unlike most
constitutional rights, the [D]ormant Commerce Clause doctrine cannot be found
in the text of any constitutional provision but is (at best) an implication from
one.”).
261. Id. at 2477 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 2478 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
263. See, e.g., id. at 2477 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). This principle is prevalent
in constitutional interpretation and fundamental to the textualist interpretive
method as the Court espoused in Alexander v. Sandoval. 532 U.S. 275, 288–89
(2001).
264. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2478 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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the text of the Amendment, state practices, and early post-ratification
precedent.265
Where previously Granholm authorized protectionist in-state
regulation of the three-tiered system provided that there existed a
demonstrable connection to some legitimate state interest, the Tennessee
Wine Court instead suggested that the durational-residency requirements
that Tennessee prescribed were inherently discriminatory, with only a
heavily attenuated connection to the legitimate state interest of bona fide
health and safety measures.266 The dissent countered that the ratification
of the Twenty-First Amendment constitutionalized an exception to the
Dormant Commerce Clause and should not be rendered superfluous
through the imposition of a jurisprudentially mandated Dormant
Commerce Clause limitation.267 The dissent also rejected the majority’s
proposition that the legitimate state purpose of the regulatory scheme must
be predicated upon the temperance principles of the Twenty-First
Amendment, instead stating that Tennessee should be exempted from
Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny because the legitimate state purpose
was increasing the price of alcohol and moderating its use under Section 2
of the Twenty-First Amendment.268
The dissent’s decision to criticize the existence of the Dormant
Commerce Clause rather than to criticize the majority’s application of it
likely stemmed from the impossibility of successfully meeting the Maine
v. Taylor exception.269 Admittedly, under the Maine v. Taylor test, there
must be no other nondiscriminatory means to achieve the end of
moderating the use of alcohol for the public health.270 When dealing with
an inherently dangerous product like alcohol, there is always another
nondiscriminatory means to benefit the public health: effect a state-wide
ban on both in-state and out-of-state alcohol.271

265. Id.
266. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
The health and safety measures in Tennessee Wine were the state’s interest in the
ability to conduct inspections of the premises; hence the desire to have the owners
reside within the state.
267. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2478 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
268. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
270. Maine, 477 U.S. at 131.
271. See generally North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990)
(“[The] core purposes [of the Twenty-First Amendment] . . . [include] promoting
temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue.”); see also
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460.
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B. An Inquiry into the Inadequacy of the Immediate Interpretation
The dissent in Tennessee Wine did not accurately portray the argument
of petitioner Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association; instead,
the dissent opted for the more radical anti-Dormant Commerce Clause
argument.272 The argument proffered by the Association in its reply brief
accurately frames the analysis that the majority took, albeit with a more
favorable outcome than that rendered by the Court.273 The Association
contended that even if Tennessee’s durational-residency requirement was
discriminatory, it was not invalidated under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, as there was a legitimate local purpose that could not otherwise be
served with nondiscriminatory means.274 The Association argued that the
durational-residency requirement furthered the twin goals of restricting the
availability of alcohol and ensuring that the sellers were tied to the
communities in which they did business.275 At the presentation of these
twin goals, the majority’s analysis shifted to whether these goals advanced
any of the Twenty-First Amendment’s principles, an analysis unaddressed
by the dissent.276 The comprehensive list of the principles underlying the
Twenty-First Amendment are as follows: (1) the promotion of
temperance; (2) the establishment or maintenance of orderly markets for
alcoholic beverage; (3) the restriction of access to alcoholic beverages by
those under the legal drinking age; and (4) raising state revenue.277 The
first principle of temperance is “closely allied” with the preservation of
public health.278 Unfortunately for the Association, even if the dissenting
Justices had opted to argue against the Maine v. Taylor exception instead
of against the existence of the Dormant Commerce Clause as a whole, the
exception would not have been met.279
The first step of the Maine v. Taylor analysis is the judicial
determination of whether there exists some legitimate local purpose for

272. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Blair,
139 S.Ct. 2449 (2019) (No. 18-96), 2019 WL 118041.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.; see also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432.
276. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432; see Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n
v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2478 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
277. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432; see also Comprehensive Alcohol
Regulatory Effectiveness Act, H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. (2010).
278. Lamar Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Miss. St. Tax Comm’n, 701 F.2d 314, 331
(5th Cir. 1983).
279. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131(1986).
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the state law.280 In the present case, there is no question that a state has a
legitimate purpose in preserving the public health of its citizens.281 This
legitimate local purpose is an implied principle of the Twenty-First
Amendment.282 The reduction of mass availability of liquor by restricting
the total number of available distributors and by making these distributors
entirely present within the state promotes both the public health of a
community and the accountability of distributors.283 First, the decreased,
but not eliminated, public access to intoxicating spirits will statistically
reduce the amount of consumption through sheer supply limitation
principles.284 Second, state monitoring and regulation are far more feasible
when the retailer transporting alcohol within a state is physically located
within that state.285 A resident retailer is inherently more invested in its
community and likely to possesses a greater incentive to comply with
alcohol laws and responsible business practices.286 Furthermore, the
resident retailer is also subject to physical inspection, whereas it would be
impracticable to adequately regulate an out-of-state entity.287 Both of the
Association’s proffered purposes advance the legitimate local purpose of
protecting the public health of the community from the dangers of
alcohol.288
The second step of the Maine v. Taylor analysis looks to the existence
of non-discriminatory alternatives to achieve the same end.289
Unfortunately for the Association, this element is difficult to satisfy, as
even an unfeasible nondiscriminatory alternative will bar the exception. In
every case concerning alcohol in which a party claims that discriminating
against an out-of-state alcohol industry participant is the only method to
advance a legitimate public health interest, this claim will fail.290 This is
280. Id.
281. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
282. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432; see also Comprehensive Alcohol
Regulatory Effectiveness Act, H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. (2010).
283. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 272, at *14–15.
284. HARRISON, supra note 20, at 13.
285. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 272, at *14–15 (demonstrating the
Tennessee legislature’s interest in “maintain[ing] a higher degree of oversight”).
286. Id.
287. Id. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, referencing the accessibility
modern technological advancement lends to off-site regulation. See Tenn. Wine
& Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2475 (2019).
288. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2475 (recognizing promotion of responsible
sales and consumption practices as “legitimate” state interests).
289. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
290. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2475 (“[T]here are obvious alternatives that
better serve that goal without discriminating against nonresidents.”).
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because all states, even after Tennessee Wine, still possess the power to
ban both in-state and out-of-state liquor.291 The ban of all liquor is a
nondiscriminatory means to achieve the beneficial end of improving
public health. As a result, even if it would be unfeasible and counterproductive to a state’s finances to prohibit all in-state and out-of-state
alcohol products, this is still a non-discriminatory manner in which the
public health will ultimately benefit.292 Although this Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis is logically sound, Granholm’s and Tennessee Wine’s
bright-line limitation on state discriminatory authority over alcohol will
produce far-reaching effects on the three-tier system and the alcohol
industry.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND MARKET IMPACTS OF TENNESSEE WINE
The Granholm and Tennessee Wine Courts’ narrow view of Section 2
of the Twenty-First Amendment represent the most pivotal shift in
interpretation since the Frankfort Court’s deviation from the Young’s
plenary view of Section 2.293 The interpretation provided in Young and the
cases that immediately followed reflected a strictly textual analysis of
Section 2.294 Utilizing this textual analysis, the early post-ratification
Court recognized Section 2 as an exception to the Commerce Clause that
granted the states plenary authority to regulate alcohol within their
borders, free of federal interference.295 The Court in Tennessee Wine
suggests that this textual interpretation was inaccurate and that those
courts did not consider the legislative intent of the pre-Prohibition acts that
informed Section 2.296 Since this early interpretation, a jurisprudential
abatement of the broad scope of Section 2’s grant of power has occurred
concurrently with the growth of e-commerce.297 Though the modern298
291. Id. at 2467.
292. Id. at 2475.
293. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
294. See Young’s, 299 U.S. at 59; Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control
Comm., 305 U.S. 391 (1938); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
295. Young’s, 299 U.S. at 59; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
296. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449.
297. See generally Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); CHURCH, supra
note 8, at 2–12.
298. For the purposes of this Comment, the “modern Court” refers to the
Granholm and Tennessee Wine Courts’ interpretations, whereas “early Court” and
“post-ratification Court” refer to the interpretations from Young’s, Indianapolis
Brewing, and Ziffrin.
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Court’s narrow interpretation of Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment is certainly correlative to market globalization through the
increase of e-commerce, a question arises as to whether there is some
causation between the growth of e-commerce and the Court’s diminishing
of the scope of the Twenty-First Amendment.299 If this relationship is more
than mere correlation, the question then becomes whether large-scale
regulatory reform is an appropriate task for the Court to undertake.300
From an economic perspective, a uniform federal regulatory scheme,
in light of the increased opportunities for direct-to-buyer shipments, may
be more beneficial to the alcohol market than varied state-run schemes.301
If the motivation behind the Court’s decision in Tennessee Wine was to
enact such a scheme, or even to eliminate state regulation and open the
market, the means used to achieve this result may have constituted a
judicial overreach.302
The interpretation that the implied Dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine supersedes the express legislative intent of Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment severely diminishes the scope of Section 2 and
will carry with it a shift toward nationalization of state liquor laws.303 The
result of nationally uniform laws could yield positive market results, as the
three-tier liquor distribution model that many states employed imposed an
undue burden on the e-commerce expansion of micro-manufacturers of
alcohol and retailers wishing to ship directly to buyers located in states
without reciprocity laws.304
After the Granholm decision, lower courts were unsure of whether to
limit the Court’s ruling to producers of wine or whether the ruling would
extend to wholesalers and retailers.305 There was a split in application
between a narrow scope and an expanded scope of Granholm.306 The
299. Bird & Kopp, supra note 2.
300. Id.
301. See Jan Kregel, Diversity and Uniformity in Economic Theory as an
Explanation of the Recent Economic Crisis, Working Paper No. 730, Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College, Aug. 2012. (“Thus, while the benefits of
free markets depend on diversity, the operation of these markets depends on
uniformity.”).
302. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
303. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
304. See, e.g., Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S.
391 (1938). The Michigan statute analyzed in Indianapolis Brewing is an example
of a reciprocity law. See supra note 132.
305. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 271.
306. Id. at 283. The split rests on which provision, between the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment, takes precedence over the
other. Id.
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narrow scope provided that the ruling from Granholm applied only to the
production tier.307 The expanded scope suggested that Granholm applied
to all three levels of the three-tier distribution system.308 The emphasis of
these courts’ rulings focuses not on discrimination against the out-of-state
product itself, but against any and all interstate commerce, regardless of
the origin of the product.309 A number of problems arose from the split,
the most pressing of which was whether a state could still pass
discriminatory laws and regulations governing direct shipment from
retailer to consumer, as the Granholm court only explicitly addressed
direct shipment from producer to consumer.310 The holding in Tennessee
Wine addressed this split and resolved it.311 The Tennessee Wine Court
took the expanded approach, which may hold fatal consequences for the
three-tier system.312 Tennessee Wine’s application will, in effect, resolve
the split in application that emerged from Granholm, either by forcing
states to “level-down” their regulatory laws concerning alcohol, or by
forcing states to open their borders for all direct-to-consumer shipping.313
A. The Three-Tier Model: Unquestionably Illegitimate?314
Tennessee Wine, applying the expanded scope of Granholm’s holding,
built upon the groundwork that Granholm laid toward a free-market.315
This suggests that the Granholm Court intended Granholm to apply to all
307. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (“[T]he three-tier system
itself is unquestionably legitimate.”) (internal quotations omitted). The Second
and Fifth Circuits took the narrow view of the holding of Granholm, stating that
the three-tier system is the exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 283.
308. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 283. The Seventh Circuit took the expanded
view of the holding of Granholm, stating that the three-tier system, while
legitimate, is subject to the limitation of the Dormant Commerce power.
309. Id. at 276.
310. See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct.
2449 (2019); see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
311. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
312. See, e.g., id.
313. See Glynn, supra note 172, at 126. Leveling down is when state laws
“create very strict controls over the sale of alcohol but apply them to both
intrastate and interstate producers, a move that does not further consumer
interests.” Id.
314. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. The Court in Granholm referred to the threetier regulatory model as “unquestionably legitimate” while simultaneously
limiting the breadth of its applicability. Id.
315. See id. at 460; Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
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three levels of the three-tier distribution system.316 In the period following
Granholm, prior to Tennessee Wine, there was an abundance of academic
speculation on what result the limitation on regulation would have on the
market.317 Scholars originally speculated that there would be a “levelingdown,” or a universal application of strict liquor regulation both in-state
and out-of-state.318 The alternative is that rather than a “leveling down,”
state governments would withdraw from the regulatory sphere, allowing
the market to regulate itself.319 Granholm alone did not result in a state
withdrawal from the regulatory sphere because of the narrow and carefully
hedged nature of its holding.320 Since Granholm only directly addressed
producers, state regulatory authorities did not entirely withdraw, as a
legitimate question remained over whether the retailer aspect of the
alcohol industry was still susceptible to discriminatory regulation.321 This
withdrawal of state regulatory authority, while it previously may have
been gradual, is now more certain to occur because of the Court taking
Granholm’s expanded approach in Tennessee Wine.322 The expanded
approach from Granholm that the Tennessee Wine Court applied
eliminates the state’s ability to regulate discriminatorily.323 Considering
that states primarily utilized the three-tier model as a means to effectuate
discriminatory regulation, rendering the three-tier model ineffective in this
respect will eliminate its usefulness in modern society.324 Rather than keep
a model that is both illegitimate and useless, it is realistic that many, if not
all, states will either abandon the three-tier model entirely or enact
universal prohibitions that apply both to in-state and out-of-state
participants.325 The abandonment of the very scheme by which states
regulated alcohol brings with it the abandonment of state regulation over

316. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 276.
317. See, e.g., id. at 265; Glynn, supra note 172, at 126.
318. Glynn, supra note 172, at 126.
319. Removal of regulatory barriers to allow market regulation is
characteristic of an open system in economics. See infra Section III.B.
320. Granholm, 544 U.S. 460.
321. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019);
see also Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 271–72.
322. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474.
323. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 283.
324. See, e.g., Todorov, supra note 25.
325. See id. See generally Kevin Koeninger, Direct-to-Consumer Wine
Shipments Debated at Sixth Circuit, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.courthousenews.com/direct-to-consumer-wine-shipments-debated-atsixth-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/WE87-8LMU].

350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd 226

2/5/21 12:55 PM

2021]

COMMENT

617

alcohol.326 Regulation over this industry, if any, will be limited to federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause.327
1. After Granholm: Direct Impacts of Direct Shipment
Without the evolution of direct shipping following the Court’s
decision in Granholm, many smaller producers would no longer be
participants in the alcohol industry.328 The evolution of direct shipping—
the alcohol producer shipping directly to retailers or consumers—is
important because larger wineries and other producers of alcohol are able
to more easily attract wholesalers, whereas the smaller producers are
fiscally unable to do so.329 Although direct shipping may not be a pivotal
part of the sales strategy of larger producers, direct-to-consumer sales are
a “critical component” of the smaller producers’ sales strategy.330 To
reference back to the micro-winery that produced only 3,000 cases of wine
per year,331 in 2014 direct shipment sales would have made up over 60%
of that micro-winery’s total sales, set to increase to over 70% by 2017.332
For larger manufacturers of alcohol, such as wineries producing over
250,000 cases of wine per year, by 2017 approximately 5% of their total
sales was attributed to direct shipment.333 Nonetheless, several states still
retained their draconian anti-direct shipment laws.334 Granholm’s
allowance of manufacturers to utilize direct-to-consumer shipping initially
326. See Todorov, supra note 25.
327. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
328. Rob McMillan, State of the Wine Industry Report 2018, SILICON VALLEY
BANK (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.svb.com/globalassets/library/images/svb2018-wine-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E254-Q5UX].
329. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 277.
330. McMillan, supra note 328.
331. Id.
332. Id.; see Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266 n.9. The numbers for 2017 were
predicted from the State of the Wine Industry Report 2018; however, the 2019
edition demonstrated numbers to the contrary. Direct-to-consumers as of the end
of 2018 made up 61% of the average family winery’s revenue.
333. McMillan, supra note 328.
334. Id. After Granholm, Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, and Utah continued to enforce anti-shipment laws for producers of
wine, with Utah and Kentucky retaining felony anti-shipping laws. It is important
to recall that “leveling down” still allows for such anti-shipping laws, provided
they apply to both in-state and out-of-state producers. See supra note 271. Glynn,
supra note 172, at 126. Leveling down is when state laws “create very strict
controls over the sale of alcohol but apply them to both intrastate and interstate
producers, a move that does not further consumer interests.” Id.
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resulted in a growth of manufacturers’ sales of alcohol, which is to be
expected.335 Following Tennessee Wine, the unpredictability of an open
system coupled with direct-to-consumer shipping from retailers may
detrimentally affect the alcohol industry as a whole.336
2. Grasping at Straws: Is State Regulation Feasible Anywhere?
The ultimate takeaway from Tennessee Wine is that states can no
longer discriminatorily regulate against out-of-state retailers, analogous to
the situation after Granholm when states could no longer discriminatorily
regulate against out-of-state producers.337 The three-tier regulatory system
was the primary avenue that states utilized to enact discriminatory laws
following the Court’s decisions in Midcal and Bacchus Imports—cases
that both emphasized the importance of the Dormant Commerce Clause
when analyzing laws enacted under Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment.338 With Granholm and Tennessee Wine, the states are no
longer afforded discriminatory regulatory authority under Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment over the first and third tiers.339 The Court in
Granholm stated that the three-tier system was “unquestionably
legitimate” under the Constitution.340 After Tennessee Wine the inquiry is
no longer a question of the three-tier system’s constitutional legitimacy,
but whether it serves any legitimately useful purpose.341
After Granholm, many of the states preserved the three-tier system
with the hope that, in Granholm, the Court intended to adopt the narrow
view, which did not apply the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis to
retailers.342 However, the Tennessee Wine Court has expressly stated that
the expanded view applies; therefore, there is no legitimate purpose for
preserving the three-tier model beyond preserving the jobs of the
wholesalers.343 In the absence of the wholesaler tier, the wholesaler’s
specialization in the procurement of varietal alcohol would become the

335. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Tenn. Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
336. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460; Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2448.
337. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460; Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
338. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980);
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984).
339. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460; Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
340. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489; Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
341. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460; Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
342. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
343. See generally Todorov, supra note 25.
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burden of the manufacturers and retailers.344 The elimination of the threetier system simply means the elimination of the mandate that some
manufacturers must go through a wholesaler, but does not necessarily
mean the market will do away with the functional wholesaler.345 With no
other legitimate purpose for preservation of the three-tier model
requirement, it is plausible to suggest that the three-tier model may very
well be facing its demise.346 States will likely continue to search for ways
to regulate the alcohol industry to maintain the status quo of the market
despite the recidivation of the three-tier model; however, while the states
search, the market will still develop.347
B. Market Implications
The Court’s gradual elimination of the regulatory barriers to
participants in the alcohol market is a form of trade liberalization.348 Trade
liberalization is the removal or reduction of regulatory barriers to the free
exchange of goods.349 Occurring concurrently with this trade liberalization
for participants in the alcohol industry, rapid technological and
communications advancements have made products more accessible
worldwide.350 This phenomenon is called globalization, which is defined
in the context of economics as the interdependence of different markets
fostered through free trade.351 As a result of significant technological
advancements, globalization has accelerated at a rapid pace since the
1990s.352 This globalization, coupled with the shift toward trade
liberalization of the alcohol market, standardized the free trade market and
rendered widespread direct-shipment more accessible to both the
consumer and burgeoning business models.353 Trade liberalization and
344. See generally Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266–67.
345. Id.
346. Todorov, supra note 25. But cf. Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 284.
347. See Todorov, supra note 25 (speculating on the advancement of the
market after the Tennessee Wine decision.); see infra Section III.B.
348. Caroline Banton & Will Kenton, Trade Liberalization, INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trade-liberalization.asp
[https://perma.cc/MT6Z-XXJC].
349. Id.
350. Hiroshi Inose, Technological Advances and Challenges in the
Telecommunications Sector, in GLOBALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 62 (Janet H. Muroyama & H. Guyford eds.,
1988).
351. Bird & Kopp, supra note 2.
352. Id.
353. Id.
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globalization are two economic phenomena that are both indicative of and
beneficial for the development of a free trade policy in the alcohol
market.354
The Court’s utilization of the Dormant Commerce Clause to eliminate
discriminatory state laws and policies concerning the importation and
transportation of alcohol could potentially effectuate a free trade policy. A
free trade policy, a favorite of the active consumer, could ultimately yield
negative economic results for the alcohol market as a whole, such as an
over-saturation of the market for direct shipment of alcohol, thereby
creating excessive or “destructive” competition.355The prevalence of the
three-tier system has long served as a barrier to alcohol’s entry into an
open market, even after Granholm.356 The three-tier system’s original
mission statement on discouraging overconsumption resurfaces in the
Court’s analysis of the pivotal Tennessee Wine case, where Justice Alito
contemplated whether the nuances of Tennessee’s regulatory scheme
furthered Tennessee’s interest in promoting temperance for the public
health.357 In light of the public’s widespread acceptance of liquor
consumption and distribution, the public’s need for bootleggers and
smugglers has decreased.358 As a result of this industry shift, organized
crime in the liquor industry has significantly declined, and free-market
supporters have echoed criticism of the three-tier system as “outdated” and
“inefficient.”359 Thus, the only policy interests supporting the three-tier
system are the principles of temperance and preservation of the market as
embodied within the legislative intent of the Twenty-First Amendment—
policy interests that the Court addressed in Granholm and Tennessee
Wine.360
This drastic shift from three-tier regulation toward an open market in
the alcohol industry may yield unintended consequences for participants
in the industry—on both sides of the sale.361 Although discriminatory
regulation may not be feasible through the three-tier system, it may be

354. See, e.g., id.; see also Banton & Kenton, supra note 348.
355. Brief for Open Markets Institute, supra note 10, at *4. An oversaturated
industry can create intense competition that results in a decrease in the quality of
service or product. HARRISON, supra note 20, at 332–34.
356. Green, supra note 199, at 39.
357. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
358. See generally Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266.
359. Glynn, supra note 172, at 126.
360. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers
Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
361. See Slaybaugh, supra note 5, at 266– 69.
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feasible through other means of regulating importation.362 For example,
the market may soon see regulation of the importation of wine through a
state’s authorized importation quantity.363 Perhaps states with a vested
interest in alcohol production, such as Oregon or California, will soon
regulate gallonage importation, limiting out-of-state wineries from directto-consumer importation of over 25 gallons of wine under the guise of
promoting temperance principles.364 The possibilities are endless with how
states may enact discriminatory regulations in the absence of the three-tier
system avenue, and there is not much the states or the federal government
can do preventatively in the meantime.365 With the discussion of the
implications of the Court’s decision in Tennessee Wine complete, this
Comment’s discussion of remedying the negative implications may begin.
Unfortunately, absent legislation, there is not a feasible remedy under
the Maine v. Taylor exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause.366 There
is no feasible remedy because despite any legitimate local purpose a state
may have to enact a law, there will always be another nondiscriminatory
alternative.367 For example, the ban of all liquor is a nondiscriminatory
means to achieve the beneficial end of improving public health. As a
result, even if it would be unfeasible and counterproductive to a state’s
finances to prohibit all in-state and out-of-state alcohol products, an
outright ban is still a non-discriminatory manner in which the public health
will ultimately benefit.368 With the existence of this alternative
nondiscriminatory means to preserve the public health, it is unlikely there
will ever be a judicial re-expansion of Section 2 of the Commerce Clause;
however, there exists a legislative remedy to the Court’s restriction of state
regulation.369

362. See, e.g., Segal, supra note 217.
363. Green, supra note 199, at 39.
364. Allowing this kind of importation may prove discriminatory to an in-state
winery as it may deprive in-state wineries with limited shipment possibilities of
their natural advantage. Additionally, allowing the direct importation of a large
quantity of wine directly to a consumer and not a retailer may prove to be violative
of the temperance principle of promoting the public health of the community. The
point is, there are numerous ways to mask discriminatory effects, and the threetier system was not the exclusive avenue to do so. See McMillan, supra note 328.
365. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489
366. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
367. See infra Part IV.
368. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449,
2475 (2019).
369. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see infra Part IV.
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IV. IF YOU CAN’T BEAT THEM, JOIN THEM: UTILIZING THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
Effectively, under the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Maine
v. Taylor analysis will never apply to alcohol, as the complete absence of
alcohol is always going to advance a public health interest more than
discriminatorily regulated alcohol because alcohol is an inherently
dangerous substance.370 Alcohol regulation, however, still may serve the
legitimate local purpose of maintaining an orderly alcoholic beverage
market.371 The implications of Tennessee Wine suggest that the previously
regulated alcohol market will develop into an open market in the absence
of state regulation.372 Notably, this absence of regulation may lead to a
diversification of the alcohol market and an ease of accessibility for the
consumer, but what seems best for the consumer now may not actually be
best for the consumer—or the market—in the long term.373
A state’s power to discriminatorily regulate alcohol may prove most
beneficial for the alcohol industry as a whole.374 Encouraging competition
between states and allowing states to act as experimental laboratories for
economic practices, specifically regarding the distribution and production
of alcohol, fosters industry growth.375 Although the micro-manufacturer of
alcohol may continue to struggle to grow in the alcohol industry under
discriminatory regulation, under a free market model, the alcohol industry
may no longer be a lucrative industry to enter.
Despite the absence of any feasible judicial remedy, there exists a
legislative remedy that embraces the Commerce Clause.376 Under Article
I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the plenary
authority to regulate interstate commerce.377 Congress should utilize its
plenary authority under the Commerce Clause to permit states to enact
discriminatory legislation over alcohol, thus rendering the Court’s
abatement of Section 2 of the Constitution meaningless.378 Such legislation
370. See Maine, 477 U.S. at 131.
371. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).
372. See supra Section III.B.
373. See generally Brief for Open Markets Institute, supra note 10.
374. Id.
375. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“There must be power in the states and the nation to remould,
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet
changing social and economic needs.”).
376. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
377. Id.
378. See id.
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would need careful drafting with clear outer bounds to prevent
discriminatory mayhem. The House of Representatives provided a
framework for new legislation with the Comprehensive Alcohol
Regulatory Effectiveness (CARE) Act of 2010.379
In 2010, the House of Representatives attempted to pass the CARE
Act in support of state-based alcohol regulation.380 Members of Congress
introduced the CARE Act to amend both the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon
Acts to make clear what states could regulate alcohol. Thus, the CARE
Act proves informative in attempting to devise limitations to a statutory
solution.381 The CARE Act provides a positive framework, informing
potential new legislation on the subject of state alcohol regulation.382
The purpose of the CARE Act was to formally recognize that alcohol
differed from other consumer products and to establish that the states
should possess the primary authority to regulate alcohol.383 The CARE Act
treated state alcohol laws with a strong presumption of validity.384 Further,
the CARE Act stated that a state law regulating alcohol shall be upheld
unless the challenging party proves the law’s invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence.385 The CARE Act possessed such a high burden
because the drafters did not want any discriminatory legislation to be
overturned.386 To prove invalidity under the CARE Act, a party had to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the law had no effect on
promoting temperance, establishing or maintaining orderly alcoholic
beverage markets, collecting alcoholic beverage taxes, structuring the
alcohol distribution system, or preventing underage drinking.387
The CARE Act’s failure to pass was due in part to flaws arising from
difficulty of application.388 One such flaw was the strong presumption of
validity given to state alcohol laws.389 The burden was on the moving party
to prove a negative—that the Twenty-First Amendment’s principles are
379. Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness Act, H.R. 5034, 111th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2010).
380. Id.
381. Id
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See Robert Taylor, An End to Wine Direct Shipping?, WINE SPECTATOR
(Apr. 16, 2011), https://www.winespectator.com/articles/an-end-to-wine-directshipping-42526 [https://perma.cc/R7YC-6Q6N].
387. H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2010).
388. Id.
389. Id.
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not implicated—with an extremely high burden of proof.390 While a clear
and convincing standard is already a difficult burden to surmount, it is
made more difficult when applied to a negative burden.391 Even placing
the burden on the non-moving party does not completely eliminate the
overly burdensome nature of the clear and convincing standard of proof.392
Despite this considerable flaw, the CARE Act still provides a valuable
framework to develop new legislation.393
Once manipulated, the CARE Act’s evidentiary standard may be
utilized in a new statute authorizing the state enactment of discriminatory
laws concerning the regulation of alcohol.394 The clear and convincing
burden of proof should be lowered, and the burden of proof should shift to
the non-moving party.395 Under this new legislative scheme, the burden
should be on the state to establish some degree of proof that one of the
principles inherent in the Twenty-First Amendment is furthered through
the challenged state law.396 Additionally, instead of requiring that there be
no other nondiscriminatory means to further the implicated Twenty-First
Amendment principle, the word “feasible” should be added.397 Altering
the second prong of the Maine v. Taylor test renders the test less
immediately dispositive concerning inherently dangerous products such as
alcohol.398 This would prevent the authorization of meaningless
discriminatory laws and adjust downward the insurmountable hurdle that
is the second element of the Maine v. Taylor exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Preserving the legitimate local purpose prong while
weakening the nondiscriminatory alternative prong present in Maine v.
Taylor will return the power to the states, creating a scenario comparable
to the state of affairs pre-Granholm.399 Consumers should not fear this
solution to be the end of Granholm’s direct-to-consumer shipment because
390. 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 301:5
(Westlaw, 8th ed. 2019) (“Clear and convincing evidence is ‘the quantum of proof
that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the truth of the
proposition in question,’ i.e., more than a preponderance while not quite
approaching the degree of proof necessary for a criminal conviction.”).
391. See id.
392. Id.
393. H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2010).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
398. Id.
399. See id. Compare Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), with Cal.
Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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direct shipment has become so ingrained in the consumer expectation that
it will likely remain in place.400 Under the proposed statutory scheme,
direct-shipment statutes would still be susceptible to challenge, but parties
are unlikely to challenge any law that would negatively affect the alcohol
market and be detrimental to a state economy.401 It is in the best interest of
each state economically, as well as consumers within alcohol market
socially, to re-authorize state discriminatory authority over alcohol.
CONCLUSION
There is no longer a need for judicial involvement concerning state
regulation of alcohol.402 Though the Supreme Court has judicially
diminished the scope of Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment, this
does not preclude Congress from authorizing state discriminatory
regulation via statute.403 The congressional enactment of a carefully
drafted statute allowing for the state regulatory discrimination of alcohol
will return the states to a pre-Granholm regulatory authority.404 A free
market, while appealing to the consumer, may bring with it potentially
fatal consequences for the alcohol industry and its participants.405
Although the Court’s analyses in Granholm and Tennessee Wine were
correct under the Dormant Commerce Clause, Congress should enact a
statute authorizing the kind of discrimination that the early postratification Court sought to allow to foster growth within the alcohol
market.406 For the reasons discussed herein, the negative implications of a
rapid free market shift on such a diverse and developing market outweigh
the temporary benefits that the avid consumer or micro-manufacturer may
experience.407
Ultimately, while an avid consumer may be thrilled initially at the
option to direct ship their favorite California vintage, that same consumer
may not be as excited when they order the same vintage three years later,
only to learn its quality has decreased substantially due to a destructive

400. McMillan, supra note 328.
401. Id.
402. See supra Part IV.
403. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
404. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
405. See infra Section III.B.
406. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S. 391 (1938);
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
407. See supra Part III.
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market.408 Realistically, in a growing industry susceptible to destructive
market conditions, a decline in quality is the least of a consumer’s
worries.409 A free market is by no means a negative market condition;
however, the volatile alcohol industry’s rapid shift to free market status
will result in a decline in alcohol quality, unhealthy industry competition,
and potentially destructive market conditions for the alcohol industry.410
A grant of discriminatory authority, subject to congressionally determined
outer limits, will result in the preservation and growth of an orderly
national alcohol market.

408. HARRISON, supra note 20, at 332–34.
409. See id.
410. See supra Section III.B.
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